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Abstract 
This paper addresses three main areas and develops a conceptual framework for identity 
fraud profiling. First, we identify the main contemporary profiling methods that are crime 
and/or business based. Second, accepting the current information systems (IS) facilitated 
attack channels and methods used by identity crime perpetrators (Jamieson & Stephens & 
Winchester 2007), we investigate how to best profile identity crime/fraud perpetrators. Here 
we are guided by relevant components of current business and crime profiling techniques. 
Second, analysis of interview data from industry and government agency participants was 
carried out using a modified grounded theoretical approach and concept mapping. Third, we 
consider, what identity fraud profiling systems target victim organisations might use and 
implement. We provide a definition for identity fraud profiling grounded from expert 
interviews, and based on profiling and identity crime literature. The major contributions of 
this paper are formation of an identity fraud profiling definition, construction of a profiling 
classification taxonomy, and development of an identity fraud profiling conceptual 
framework. This also involves providing an understanding of the framework’s main elements, 
their relationships and application to identity fraud profiling. This framework will be useful to 
law enforcement, industry organisations, and government agencies when fighting to deter, 
detect, and prevent identity crime.   
Keywords: Identity attributes, information systems (IS), identity crime, identity fraud, identity 
theft, identity deception, profiling, identity fraud profiling. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
The accumulated losses caused by identity crime and related crimes (money laundering, 
terrorism, trafficking – drugs, people, weapons, etc.) globally were estimated at up to US$2 
trillion by the end of 2005 (Gordon & Willox 2006, Media-Newswire 2007). These costs are a 
significant motivation for identifying identity crime/fraud profiling methodologies, tools and 
solutions to deter, prevent and detect identity crime events. Other motivations for identity 
crime profiling include: “profiling is a powerful, critical and worrying technology because it 
is probably the only way that massive volumes of data about individual and group behaviour 
can be mined, whether for nefarious or benign purposes” (Hildebrandt & Backhouse 2005, p. 
1); is a means to reduce organisations potential exposures through detection of identity crime 
acts; is an active strategy to mitigate the real threat of identity crime; profiling has deterrence 
and prevention effects from good intelligence to detect perpetrator identity crime innovations; 
and to combat identity fraud by limiting its spread or in a monitoring role (De 2004). In 
addition, profiling is a powerful method to summarise data/information to be better able to 
manage identity crime data or information from many disparate information systems (IS) or 
knowledge management systems (KMS) online or offline via information sharing. 
Identity crime is a general term covering identity fraud, identity theft, and identity deception 
(Lockhart & Jamieson & Winchester & Sarre 2007, Wang & Chen & Aatabakhsh 2004). 
Identity fraud “refers to the gaining of money, goods, services or other benefits through the 
use of a false identity” obtained via preceding identity theft and/or identity deception acts 
(Australasian Centre for Policing Research 2006, p. 9). Identity theft is the theft of an 
individual’s or organisation’s ‘identity’ attribute or their personal identifying information 
(PII) authentication details. Identity deception (also known as assumed identity, false identity, 
fictitious identity, fraudulent identity, synthetic identity fraud, etc) is the obtaining of 
another’s identity (real, lent or fictitious) attributes or authentication details by deception 
(Lockhart & Jamieson & Winchester & Sarre 2007). Opportunities have arisen for 
perpetrators of identity fraud to exploit the current situation through: the anonymity afforded 
in IS by Internet/mobile technologies; multi-jurisdictional issues; and privacy laws. Personal 
identifying information such as, PINs, passwords, key tokens, and biometrics when issued are 
often linked to other underlying ‘identity attributes’ or proof of identity (POI) data. Data in 
the form of POI documentation and PII are critical to identity fraud perpetrator(s) success. 
Proof of identity information includes: biometric (e.g., fingerprints); attributed (e.g., your full 
name); and biographical (e.g., education or employment history) ‘identity’ attributes. 
Contemporary profiling methods, categories of identity fraud perpetrators, perpetrator attack 
methods, and identity attributes in the form of POI documentation or PII will be guiding 
concepts for an identity fraud/crime profiling definition and conceptual framework. 
“Profiling has the potential for use in identity fraud, yet its use and effectiveness for industry 
has not yet been studied” (Le Lievre & Jamieson 2005, p. 2). This study elaborates on the 
identified gap in the literature. The aim of our paper is to develop a taxonomy identifying 
what, where and how profiling is currently being used to help profile identity fraud 
perpetrators and their attacks, and to develop a conceptual framework of identity fraud 
profiling. Our proposed definition of profiling for identity fraud is: “the identification, 
collection and analysis of personal identity information, to build a profile of a perpetrator, 
including: biometric; attribute; and biographical attributes. These attributes identify an 
identity fraud perpetrator through attempting to or having gained proof of identity (POI) 
documentation and/or personal identifying information (PII) details from targeted entity 
victims (organisations, trusts, partnerships or individuals etc) through a continuum of methods 
defined either as identity theft or identity deception”. This paper is arranged as follows: 
Section 2 reviews the identity crime and related profiling literature. Section 3 describes the 
profiling theoretical framework. Section 4 sets out our methodology. Section 5 discusses 
interviewee information. Section 6 briefly explains the implications and limitations of the 
paper. Section 7, concludes and discusses our future research program.   
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Profiling comes in many forms and interacts with IS environments (Clarke 1993) when 
seeking to mitigate abuse (Straub & Nance 1990) and other criminal acts offline or online 
(Casey 2000), including identity crimes such as identity theft, identity deception, and identity 
fraud (Le Lievre & Jamieson 2005). Examples of profiling in an IS context, include: 
behavioural profiling (Egger  1999, Turvey 2000); geographical profiling (Rossmo 2000); 
user profiling (Fawcett & Provost 1997); intrusion detection/network profiling (Dickerson & 
Dickerson 2000); customer profiling (Wiedmann & Buxel & Walsh 2002); 
transactions/applications profiling (Fawcett & Provost 1997, Urgaonkar & Shenoy & Roscoe 
2002); identity fraud profiling (De 2004, Le Lievre & Jamieson 2005); and identity fraud 
related crimes, such as, terrorist profiling (Ballard & Hornik & McKenzie 2002, Davies 
2003), and drug trafficking profiling (Batton & Kadleck 2004, Becton 1987). Profiling 
methods from both crime and business categories also have a large IS component in data and 
digital image storage for later retrieval and analysis through information sharing, data 
matching (often called computer matching in the US) and data mining techniques. Sometimes 
data is collected without permission or knowledge of the user e.g., CCTV, cookies, etc. 
Profiling may be scientific or non-scientific (Hicks & Sales 2006), singular or aggregative 
(Marx & Reichman 1984), and proactive or reactive (Fredrickson & Siljander 2002). Crime 
profiling of the offender/perpetrator can also follow the methodology of organised (above 
average traits e.g., intelligent quotient (IQ), competent) or disorganised i.e., below average 
IQ, inadequate (Petherick 2006). Profiling techniques, aided by machine learning programs, 
can be classified as supervised or unsupervised. An example, of unsupervised learning 
includes profiling of superimposed frauds in the telecommunications and mobile phone 
sectors. The many types of profiling may also be categorised according to their underlying 
focus, for example, crime profiling, business (i.e., sometimes called marketing and/or 
consumer) profiling, and fraud/identity crime profiling. Moreover profiling in an IS sense 
“constitutes multi-factor screening (if conducted on transactions) or multi-factor file-analysis 
(if conducted at some subsequent time)” (Clarke 1993, p. 5). Scientific modeling should 
distinguish itself from non-scientific models of profiling according to the following “scientific 
criteria: development of a theory about profiling (e.g., criminal); hypothesis generation; 
operationalisation of methods used in profiling; and empirical validation, including a 
consideration of both disconforming evidence and the limitations of the supporting research” 
(Hicks & Sales 2006, p. 87).  
As a scientific method, “profiling can be viewed as pattern recognition through systematically 
collecting, organising and analysing information collected by observation or measurement, 
drawing conclusions in assessing criminal suspicion, and sharing data with others where there 
are no privacy restrictions or other legal impediments. The method demands that procedures 
be objective or free from personal bias and emotion. Increased objectivity allows a 
knowledgeable person to check the data, as required” (Gallo 2003, p. 18). However, other 
views have posited that “a criminal profile is more of an educated surmise and/or a non-
scientific opinion” (Turvey 2000, p. 4). When investigators use profiling to try and solve 
crimes that have already happened they are being reactive. Proactive profiling involves 
attempts to inhibit and stop crime before it happens, and has been defined, "to make 
judgments about another, relative to possible criminal activity, based on a number of overt 
and subtle factors which may or may not include things such as a person's race, manner of 
dress and grooming, behavioural characteristics, when and where (geographical) the 
observation is made, the circumstances under which the observation is made, and relative to 
information the officer (law enforcement) may already possess" (Fredrickson & Siljander 
2002, p. 15). Singular profiling looks at discrete elements or acts, for example, a male 
purchasing a one-way airline ticket. Aggregative profiling involves the “reoccurrence of 
characteristics that eventuating once would not raise alarm. Yet with their occurrence across 
events should raise alerts for further inspection” (Marx & Reichman, p. 431).   
At present there is very little published research on identity crime profiling techniques. An 
exception is a paper by ID Analytics (Fest 2005) that studied criminals who trafficked in fake 
(i.e., identity deception) and stolen (identity theft) identities over a two-year period. The study 
analysed 300 million account applications and observed several ‘tactics’ and ‘patterns of 
behaviour’ used by perpetrators using true-name fraud (identity theft) and synthetic identity 
fraud (identity deception). They found that “these guys (perpetrators) perform true-name 
fraud or synthetic identity fraud – but they do not do both” (Fest 2005, p. 12). The tactics 
adopted by “‘synthetic fraud rings’ (demonstrated) preference for creating female names 
(with) almost 63 percent of false identities (being) …woman’s names, compared to just 44 
percent in identity theft cases” (Fest 2005, p. 13).  
In addition, two identity fraud profiling studies that help fill this void are papers that propose 
an outline for the role of profiling (De 2004) and an initial conceptual model (Le Lievre & 
Jamieson 2005) for identity fraud. De (2004) discusses the role of profiling in the detection 
and prevention of identity fraud within a ‘crime’ and under a ‘systems’ context. The systems 
perspective was considered because, the profiling techniques are most likely to be 
implemented in computer systems (i.e., data can be digitised, matched, shared). The research 
by De (2004) further discusses the ‘utility’ of using profiling in combating identity fraud, as 
well as potential limitations of its nature as not being currently in wide use and public. These 
limitations to its wider use include privacy or unethical issues and the property rights or 
sensitive nature of the operations and systems within the ‘black box’ that run the profiling 
algorithms and procedures, especially if they were to fall into the hands of the unscrupulous 
or even perpetrators themselves. De (2004) made several findings in his research. First, three 
issues were found that made it difficult to combat identity fraud including: appropriate 
definitions of identity fraud and related terms; commercial business constraints in the form of 
cost and benefits; and privacy. Second, five barriers to identity fraud profiling uptake were 
found, including: cost-benefit rewards; adequacy of current methods; robustness of unique 
personal identifiers; the structure of organisational systems; and privacy issues. Since 2004 
these difficulties and barriers are now less restrictive. A study by Le Lievre and Jamieson 
(2005) puts forward an initial pre-conception model of identity fraud profiling. In their model 
they highlight five sequential stages from perpetrator, mode of attack, target system, target 
entity, through to the victim and suggest that “as a profile carries limited value independently 
it is important to analyse the interactions of profiles, which may carry more value for identity 
fraud detection and prevention strategies” (Le Lievre & Jamieson 2005, p. 5). Building a 
comprehensive understanding of the way personal documentation and information is obtained 
by perpetrators is one of the best mitigation strategies for identity fraud – profiling does this. 
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK – PROFILING TAXONOMY 
Table 1 summarises various crime and business profiling methods. It outlines the profiling 
name, profiling domain, gives a brief description, then provides profiling basis, context with 
respect to ability to computerise (in terms of collating, storing, analysing, matching, or 
sharing the data or information), and theoretical background with example authors in that 
profiling domain. There are five panels in Table 1 each classifies a different profiling 
category. The first category is crime profiling in Panel A. Business profiling, fraud profiling 
and identity fraud related crimes profiling, and identity fraud profiling categories are shown in 
Panels B, C, D, and E respectively. As outlined in Table 1 a wealth of available literature 
refers to profiling in various terms, including offender profiling, criminal profiling, 
geographical profiling, criminal personality profiling, behavioural profiling, psychological 
profiling, and criminal investigative analysis (Nathan 2005). Profilers use inductive/deductive 
strategies, intuition or investigative psychology based on clinical, environmental, social 
analysis, cognitive psychology, forensic psychiatry and law enforcement principles. “Despite 
these conceptual differences, authors generally define profiling as interpreting crime scene 
behaviour in order to devise an offender profile covering gender, age, race, intelligence, 
interpersonal relationships, employment and location” (Nathan 2005, p. 1).  
Profiling Name Profiling
Domain
Description Type/basis Context: Ability
to Computerise*
Theory/ Background
(e.g., Author/s)
Panel A: Crime Profiling Methods
Deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA)
Crime An individual's unique sequence of DNA base
pairs left at crime scene
Biometrics
Biological
High Genetics and biological science (Aitken
1995)
Criminal/ Offender Crime Behaviours, characteristics, and history of
perpetrator or left at a crime scene allows
inferences to be made about the offender
Behavioural,
Demographical
Medium to high Psychological/ Behavioural Science (Cook
& Hinman 1999, Hicks & Sales 2006,
Petherick 2006, Turvey 2000)
Organised Crime Crime Group of persons (>3) organise to commit a
crime for profit e.g., Mafia, Bikers, Al-Qa’ida
Sociology and
behavioural
Low to medium Sociology and behavioural (Hicks & Sales
2006)
Crime Scene Crime Make inferences from behaviours and
characteristics left at a crime scene
Behavioural/
Psychological
Medium Forensics/Spatial/ Behavioural Science
(Davis 1999)
Racial Crime Race, colour, ethnicity, ancestry, religion, or
place of origin used to determine profile
Race and
ethnicity
Medium to high Genealogy (Batton & Kadleck 2004, Davies
2003, Hing 2006)
Psychological/
Behavioural
Crime Applicable for serial crimes – analyse, deduce
patterns
Psychology and
personality
Low to medium Psychological/ Behavioural (Egger 1999,
Turvey 2000)
Demographic (also
Geodemographic)
Crime/
Commerce
Demographics are used to segment/cluster
individuals into groups -also using
location/GPS (Global Positioning System)
Demographical High Media studies, advertising, marketing, and
polling (Mowen & Minor 1998, Rossmo
2000)
Geographic/Investi-
gative psychology)
Crime/
Commerce
Location and distance between locations Spatially High Spatial, psychological, criminological
(Canter 2003, Rossmo 2000)
Victim/target Crime/
Commerce
Permits inferences to made about perpetrator Behavioural/
Demographical
Medium to high Psychological/Behavioural Science (Canter
2003, Petherick 2006, Turvey 2000)
Intelligence
Quotient (IQ)
Crime/
Commerce
Intelligence Personality Medium to high Intelligence (Miller 1995)
Panel B: Business/Consumer Profiling Methods
Customer (Offline
& Online Profiling)
Commerce Analyse customers' behaviour and preferences
(when online often without customers knowing
or permission) for marketing/targeting to
Personality High Behavioural Science (Clarke 1993,
Wiedmann & Buxel & Walsh 2002)
Personal
Customer
Commerce Accumulation of data concerning a particular
individual - to market to
Personality and
Demographical
High Behavioural Science/ Marketing/Data
Surveillance (Clarke 1993, Wiedmann &
Buxel & Walsh 2002)
Abstract
Customer
Commerce/
Crime
Describes a general class of person for
comparison purposes against a larger data set
Personality High Behavioural Science/ Marketing/Statistical
(Clarke 1993)
Application Commerce/
Crime
Assemblage of metadata element selected from
one or more metadata schemas and combined
Personality High Behavioural Science (Urgaonkar & Shenoy
& Roscoe 2002)
Panel C: Fraud Profiling Methods (IS Enabled)
Continuous
Audit/Assurance
Crime/
Commerce
Evaluate system design and error-prevention
procedures
Systems High IT/Engineering/Auditing (Loh & Jamieson
2002)
Intrusion (e.g.,
Anomalies)
Crime Analyse intruders behaviour and attack modus
operandi (MO)
Personality High Behavioural Science (Dickerson &
Dickerson 2000, Wang & Guan & Zhang &
Yang 2006)
User/Transactions Crime/
Commerce
Analyse users' behaviour and preferences
history for marketing/targeting or to stop
transactions
Personality High Behavioural Science (Adomavicius &
Tuzhilin 1999, Fawcett & Provost 1997)
Panel D: Identity Fraud Related Crimes Profiling Methods (i.e., Identity Theft, and/or Identity Deception Enables and Facilitates these Crimes)
People Trafficking Crime Couriering of people across jurisdictions Behavioural Medium Behavioural (Hing 2006)
Drug Trafficking Crime Importation of illegal drugs across jurisdictions Behavioural Medium Behavioural (Batton & Kadleck 2004,
Becton 1987)
Hijacking (Airline) Crime Take hostages to make demands/statement
(e.g., political)
Behavioural Medium Psychological/ Behavioural (Hing 2006)
Money Laundering Crime The manipulation and use of money or property
to hide its illegal source
Behavioural High/Medium Behavioural Science (Cuellar 2003)
Terrorist/Arms/
Trafficking
Crime Terrorism acts and events/Importation and
couriering of illegal arms or weapons across
jurisdictions
Behavioural Medium Psychological/Behavioural (Ballard &
Hornik & McKenzie 2002, Davies 2003,
Hing 2006)
Panel E: Identity Fraud/Fraud Profiling Methods (also Identity theft and identity deception)
Identity Fraud/
Theft /Deception
Crime Biometric, biographical, and attributed identity
characteristics
Potentially all
of above
Medium to high Behavioural Science (De 2004, Le Lievre &
Jamieson 2005)
Table 1. Profiling Taxonomy of Crime, Business/Consumer, Fraud, Identity Fraud Related Crimes, and Identity Fraud Profiling Methods.
* The ability to computerise is in terms of collating, storing, analysing, matching, or sharing the data. High means the underlying data is mostly stored
digitally; medium means usually in digital format; and low means underlying data is seldom stored digitally for analysis or sharing at sometime etc.
“Induction and deduction are among the most pivotal theoretical and practical issues in criminal 
profiling, yet they are the most poorly understood. Induction involves statistical or correlational 
reasoning whereby the current offender is assessed by virtue of their difference or similarity to past 
like offenders. Deduction, on the other hand, involves in-depth analysis of the current case and 
involves reasoning where, if the evidence collected is accurate, then the conclusions which flow from 
that evidence must also be accurate” (Petherick 2006, p. 1). Inductive criminal profiling develops its 
profile of a suspect based on the results gathered from other crime scenes. Further, inductive criminal 
profiles draw on formal and informal studies of known criminals, on the experience of the profiler, and 
on publicly available data sources, to provide guidance. The term and concept of ‘profiling’ has come 
to have many different meanings. The Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) examines physical and 
behavioral evidence of an offense after it has occurred and, based on that information, draw inferences 
about potential characteristics of the person who committed the crime. On the other hand, 
counterterrorism is primarily concerned with the identification and interruption of terrorist activity 
before an attack occurs. In summary, identity fraud profiling can benefit from elements of all profiling 
methods outlined in our first four categories of profiling methodologies in Panels A-D of Table 1. 
Specific methods and their concepts will be beneficial to identity fraud profiling due to their high 
computerisation and implementation within a KMS context (i.e., ability to share, match or mine data) 
and environment included: geographic profiling; abstract profiling; application profiling; intrusion 
profiling; user profiling (transactions profiling); activity profiling; and money laundering profiling. 
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research questions for this study of identity fraud profiling include: 
• What is identity fraud profiling?  
• What profiling methods are available that could be applied to identity fraud? 
• What concepts surrounding these methods are best suited to an identity fraud profiling framework? 
Because direct access to identity fraud perpetrators’ behaviour is often restricted, we are limited in our 
ability to develop empirically based theories specifically on perpetrator identity fraud profiling. 
Therefore we must rely more on existing general profiling techniques of crime, business/consumer, 
fraud, identity fraud related crimes, and interviews of industry experts of targeted organisations to 
understand the identity crime phenomenon for identity fraud profiling. In an effort to identify what 
these existing theories suggest about profiling, a literature review is conducted to identify similarities 
and differences among profiling methodologies relevant to further developing identity fraud profiling 
methods. For our selected interviews, modified grounded theory was used. Grounded theory is defined 
as a “general methodology for developing theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered and 
analysed. Theory evolves during actual research, and it does this through continuous interplay between 
analysis and data collection” (Strauss and Corbin 1994, p. 273). Over 26 experts from 12 different 
organisations (banks, retailers, national and State government agencies who are issuers and users of 
POI) were interviewed. Interviews were recorded, transcribed, checked, and coded using qualitative 
software (NVivo 2, QSR International). The majority of participant interviews were face-to-face with 
duration of about 90 minutes. Two out of state organisation’s interviews were by teleconference. 
Researchers have documented a need and a plan for identity crime research (Gordon & Willox 2006, 
Le Lievre & Jamieson 2005).  We develop our profiling classification taxonomy (Table 1) and use a 
cognitive mapping tool (Cmap 4.12) to construct an identity fraud profiling framework (Figure 1).  
5 IDENTITY FRAUD PROFILING FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT 
Concept mapping software (Cmap 4.12) and a modified grounded theoretical approach guided the 
development of themes and linkages between the concepts in the identity fraud profiling model (see 
Figure 1). Six main themes (bolded) emerged with the support of a literature review on contemporary 
profiling methods, semi-structured interviews of government agency and private sector industry 
experts, development of our definition for identity fraud profiling, and prior identity crime/fraud 
research classifying identity fraud perpetrators and their attack methodologies (Jamieson & Stephens 
& Winchester 2007). We discuss the top level themes in Figure 1 in the following subsections, 
commencing with identity attributes and ending with identity fraud profiling methods. 
 
Figure 1. Framework for Developing an Identity Fraud Profiling Conceptual Model 
5.1 ‘Identity’ Attributes 
Reinforcing the reliance on identity attributes we posited in the introduction, there are three main 
identity attributes (biometric, attributed, and biographical) that link to proof of identity documentation 
in the Australian Identification System. Identity attributes linked to POI documents and personal 
identifying information is critical to ‘attack category used on a target firm or customer victim’. This is 
the underlying information a perpetrator seeks, through identity theft or identity deception, to commit 
identity fraud acts against targets to secure money or assets. Biometric attributes are becoming more 
important and constitute inclusion on an expanding number of different POI documentation e.g., 
passports. Due to the underlying data, being based on attributes such as finger prints, face geometry, 
DNA or voice patterns that do not change (substantially) over an individual’s life. Past reliance on 
attributed and biographical attributes is waning due to perpetrators ability to compromise this on POI 
documents more easily. In a growing number of cases perpetrators just invent identity detail (i.e., 
identity deception). Two interviewee (National Government Participant) examples that supported the 
identity attributes theme and concept links were: 
“Talking about the hundred points system, if the documents can be false, what’s the point?’ One area 
of interest will be, is it a fact that the more documents you make someone produce and of more 
different types in a particular name, is it more likely that they’re actually real? If I’ve actually got an 
electricity bill with my home address, does that mean that it’s a stronger system? Passwords and PINs 
do they make it stronger or not, given that we all use these things to prove our identity? Or questions 
where they go, ‘just give us your mother’s maiden name?’, and I go ’it’s Smith’?  
Our long term strategy is a whole of government approach ultimately to getting better integrity into 
our documents and having better means of validating documents. Also better methodologies on how 
perpetrators are getting hold of the documents? I mean in terms of strengthening the types of 
documents we have so that they can’t be copied. And the biometrics side - what are the best ways of 
using biometrics? Is having a photo or thumb print on a document the best way to go?  
5.2 Perpetrator Attack Category Used on Target Firm of Customer Victims 
Recent identity crime models (Jamieson & Stephens & Winchester 2007) categorise perpetrators, 
identify groups of methodologies in use and illustrate underlying actual methods in these groups to 
gain POI or PII details. In Figure 1, perpetrators categories are illustrated as concepts ‘organised 
crime’, ‘insiders’, ‘sophisticated ‘ and ‘opportunistic individuals’. Perpetrator channels are shown as 
‘traditional methods’, devices’, and ‘e-commerce’ concepts with examples for each given (Jamieson & 
Stephens & Winchester 2007). It is these underlying techniques implemented by perpetrators that are 
the key to the perpetrator gaining identity details permitting identity fraud acts to be initiated against 
target organisations (Jamieson & Stephens & Winchester 2007, Lockhart & Jamieson & Winchester & 
Sarre 2007).   
5.3 Identity Fraud and Related Crime Perpetrators 
To the casual observer identity fraud may give the impression of a serious economic crime that targets 
organisations such as financial institutions, and that it is a victimless non-violent crime. The reality is 
that identity fraud can be a violent crime as it is an enabler of related crimes. A number of the related 
crimes are themselves enablers of or consequence of each other. Identity fraud related crime methods 
that are profiled include, money laundering, terrorism, hijacking (airline), drug trafficking, people 
trafficking, and arms and weapons trafficking. These profiling methods are established in theory and 
by empirical analysis on a similar basis to the crime profiling methodologies. We have categorised 
them separately because a major characteristic of these crimes is the underlying link to identity fraud 
through identity theft or identity deception, which acts as a premise for these perpetrators maintaining 
anonymity which, in turn, facilitates them to evade detection at least in the short to medium term.  
An interviewee comment that reinforces the ‘identity fraud and related crime perpetrators’ theme and 
concept links is: “Our analysts do work that finds information in the data and then we alert other 
agencies. A pattern may suggest, either drug trafficking or people smuggling or identity crime and it’s 
amazing what sort of patterns are found. There are patterns that they can actually go – this looks like 
not just drug trafficking, this looks like heroin trafficking as opposed to something else. Once they’ve 
found that sort of pattern, then we are not an investigating agency at all, and it is referred off to, the 
police or other appropriate agencies” (National Government Participant). 
5.4 Contemporary Profiling Methods 
Currently used profiling methodologies were categorised (refer Table 1) into five distinct groups – 
crime, business, fraud, identity fraud related, and identity fraud methods. This taxonomy allowed for 
deeper understanding of the distinct profiling linkages between ‘attack category used on a target firm 
of customer victim’, ‘identity fraud (perpetrator)’, and ‘identity fraud profiling methods’ themes. 
Interestingly a previous identified concept ‘organised crime’ has its own well developed profiling 
literature with theory and empirical studies. 
Interviewee examples that help build a case for categorised contemporaneous profiling methods: 
“…‘look at all these hits’. All these people in the Australian Crime Commissions fraud register we’ve 
got records of transactions that they’ve made” (National Government Participant). 
“Recently the police came to us and said … well they think it could have been an outer state number 
plate at one stage and they asked us to do the scan of our database. And we gave them information 
back that met that profile. On another occasion they actually caught the offenders and charged them. 
We are establishing trust for assistance both ways” (State Government Participant). 
5.5 Identity Fraud Profiling Methods 
Interviewees monitored their businesses transactions, products, channels, employees, internal and 
perimeter systems and procedures in a variety of ways. These included: using third parties to acquire 
data to match and verify identities, off the shelf and proprietary user monitoring and authentication 
systems (CCTV and software), data matching, data mining, formal and informal information sharing 
about attacks of known perpetrators, rigorous agent (employee etc.) screening, and audits. 
This paper makes the following additional contributions to identity fraud profiling methodology as a 
foundation for more empirical research and in developing tools and systems solutions to deter, detect 
and prevent identity crime/fraud. First, we provide a definition for identity fraud profiling that gives 
scope for developing our conceptual model, future empirics, and solutions. Second, we highlight the 
important links between identity attributes, POI, PII and their related critical importance to the 
perpetrator attack category through three previously identified channels and their underlying methods 
(Jamieson & Stephens & Winchester 2007). The examples of the underlying attack methods give clues 
of how perpetrators obtain POI/PII details and their subsequent use in identity fraud acts that need to 
be profiled. Third, a profiling taxonomy is used to categorise techniques where components are 
applicable to identity fraud profiling and we show how these links relate to the identity fraud 
perpetrator theme (and concept, e.g., organised crime), targeted firm and customer victims. Fourth, 
practitioners and our industry experts use a vast array of methods to deter, detect, and prevent 
perpetrators. They seek to corroborate in the background, who they are undertaking business with by 
validating details such as, name, address, age, mothers’ maiden name, unique identifiers (alpha and 
numerical) on identity, passport, social security, tax, welfare, medical, licences, and student 
documents or cards. Most of these documents or cards are easily replicated based on real or invented 
individuals by perpetrators as they relied on attributed or biographical attributes and less on 
biometrics. Where biometrics are used, such as, signature on a cheque, photo in a passport or license, 
perpetrators were also able to forge or replace these biometrics by-passing those controls. Finally, to 
successfully profile identity fraud and related perpetrators, targeted entities need to take into account 
all themes and concepts shown  in the cognitive framework (see Figure 1). Exact profiling is possible, 
but will probably need to be biometric attribute based. 
6 IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Profiling is a broad discipline and we have categorised profiling into five main areas to facilitate our 
framework focusing on the identity fraud profiling research aim. This approach is to be crystallised 
through developing and implementing identity fraud profiling systems (techniques and tools) and 
strategies as part of a suite of deterrence, detection and prevention measures aimed at combating 
identity fraud. Moreover, appropriate legislation needs to be in place for law enforcement to be able to 
bring perpetrators to justice for identity crimes. Limitations to studying identity fraud profiling include 
IS privacy and security issues in obtaining access to perpetrators and their data for analysis purposes.   
7 CONCLUSIONS 
The majority of the general crime and business/customer based profiling methodologies have 
procedures, techniques, information collection, collation, storing, and analysis techniques applicable to 
developing identity fraud profiling models (systems and tools). This is especially true in an IS 
environment where there is the ability to computerise (digitise) data for profiling the underlying 
information. This is important because currently, identity fraud perpetrators are targeting financial 
institutions or other business sectors (e.g. government agencies, retailers, utility organisations) and 
online financial facilities to misappropriate funds, goods, or avoid payments or losses. Therefore the 
ability to mitigate these acts in real-time in an IS environment (face-to-face or customer-not-present 
situations) is critical. The discussion posits larger budgets for IS system upgrades, innovations and 
methods like, profiling as a solution to mitigate identity fraud e.g., at airports entry points. Integrating 
relevant techniques of the above profiling methodologies into an identity fraud profiling model should 
reduce the quantity of identity fraud perpetrator events and permit healthy continuation of business in 
legitimate organisations uninterrupted by identity crime attempts or acts.  
Key barriers to the use of profiling by organisations, (especially small or micro-organisations) include, 
high setup and ongoing costs, the largely unquantifiable benefits of profiling identity fraud and related 
perpetrators, the perceived adequacy of current techniques (and their updating versions), a lack in 
strength of key identifying characteristics entering models (statistical errors e.g., high false positives), 
and the varied nature of organisational systems development (legacy issues) and ongoing legal and 
privacy ramifications. Biometric capture of ‘identity’ attributes in POI and PII should lead to exact 
identity profiling outcomes and reduction in identity fraud and related crimes. The contribution of this 
paper is our identity fraud profile definition, our classification scheme of the five profiling categories 
developed through our analysis of the profiling literature, and the mapping of these themes and 
concepts with prior identity crime models. The result is an identity fraud profiling model incorporating 
all these themes, concepts, and linkages. Our future research agenda includes the introduction of 
identity fraud and related crime profiling solutions, using methods, such as, computational 
immunology, for application in IS environments for use in targeted sector organisations.  
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